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ABSTRACT 
This article looks at the communal violence in Ambon, Poso and Sambas in post-Suharto 
Indonesia from a comparative perspective. It explores why Ambon and Poso were seen as 
religious while Sambas was seen as ethnic despite the fact that in all three conflicts different 
religions and ethnicities fought each other. Examining the ‘ethnic’ elements, this article 
advances three arguments: First, that the Poso and Ambon conflicts were no less ethnic than 
the Sambas conflict as they had similar ‘ethnic causes’. Second, that the religious narrative 
dominated in Ambon and Poso because it reflected the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia since 
the 1990s while the narrative in Sambas reflected that it was  the latest round of a pre-existing 
anti-Madurese conflict which had already been ‘defined’ as ‘ethnic’. Third, that the narratives 
were framed strategically, thus influencing the trajectory of the conflict but also responding 
to it. 
KEYWORDS Indonesia, Ambon, Poso, Sambas, ethnic conflict, religious conflict 
 
After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia experienced an upsurge in Islamist, 
separatist and communal violence. This violence erupted in the context of the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy which saw a drawn-out struggle in Jakarta between the ‘old’ 
elites associated with the New Order regime and the reformist challengers (Crouch 2010). 
This political transition provided an opportunity for separatists to push for independence as 
seen in East Timor  (Kingsbury 2000, Martinkus 2001, Greenlees and Garran 2002) and Aceh 
(Schulze 2004, Davies 2006, Aspinall 2009), for radical Islamists to challenge the nature of 
the state (Conboy 2005, Sidel 2006; Solahudin 2013), for communities to reshape local socio-
political and economic constellations (Van Klinken 2007, Davidson 2008, McRae 2013), and 
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for politicians, military officers, and businessmen to stir up and manipulate these conflicts for 
their own ends (Tomagola 2001, Aditjondro 2004). While the fall of Suharto set the ball 
rolling, the roots of violence in Indonesia lay far deeper, in the narrow conception of the 
Indonesian nation and the way in which this was institutionalised (Bertrand 2004, Tajima 
2014). New Order policies of development, transmigration and ‘uniformisation’ resulted in 
resource exploitation and cultural marginalisation outside Java and were perceived as 
‘Javanese colonialism’.                               
This article is a comparative study of three of Indonesia’s communal conflicts – 
Ambon (in Maluku province), Poso (in Central Sulawesi province) and Sambas (in West 
Kalimantan province) - which the literature on post-Suharto violence has either looked at 
separately or referred to only in passing in the analysis of the broader transition dynamics. 
These three conflicts erupted within weeks of each other late 1998/early 1999. They erupted 
in the urban centres and spread from there to neighbouring villages, and in the case of the 
Ambon conflict to neighbouring islands. All three conflicts had multiple causes - ethnic, 
religious, political, social, and economic. In all three conflicts there were clear links between 
the violence and local politics both in terms of timing and mobilisation (Van Klinken 2007, 
Aragon 2007, Davidson 2008, McRae 2013). All three saw clashes between locals and 
migrants as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet the Indonesian newspapers such 
as Kompas, Merdeka, Media Indonesia, Republika or Suara Pembaruan described the 
violence in Ambon and Poso as ‘konflik antaragama’ (religious conflict), identifying the 
actors as Muslims and Christians while the Sambas conflict was described as ‘perang 
antaretnis’ (ethnic warfare) and the actors were identified as Dayak, Malays, and Madurese. 
This categorisation is also present in other observer narratives such as reports by human 
rights organisations as well as in the academic literature. The Sambas conflict, which lasted 
from 19 February until May 1999, is seen as having started with a Malay offensive followed 
by a joint Malay-Dayak offensive. The Poso conflict, which lasted from 24 December 1998 
until 2007, is described as having had two phases of urban Christian-Muslim clashes, 
followed by a short Christian offensive, a lengthy Muslim offensive, and post-agreement 
terrorism. The Ambon conflict, which lasted from 19 February 1999 until 2003, is depicted as 
comprising three phases of Christian-Muslim violence in 1999, followed by a Muslim 
offensive in 2000, and post-agreement terrorism. Moreover, analyses of the Ambon conflict 
have often focused on the role of religion (Bartels 2003, Gaspersz 2005, al-Qurtuby 2015), 
the role of the Protestant church (Hehanussa 2013), and the role of Laskar Jihad (Schulze 
2002, Bräuchler 2005, Hasan 2006). Jihadist violence has also been the focus of analyses of 
the Poso conflict (McRae 2013; Karnavian 2008). 
This article does not discuss the general causes of these conflicts, their timing, or the 
role of religion as these have already been addressed in the existing literature. Instead it 
examines the ‘ethnic’ dimension from a comparative perspective, starting with the question 
of whether the Ambon and Poso conflicts were indeed less ethnic than Sambas. ‘Ethnic’ 
refers to the identity markers of a particular suku (ethnic group) such as adat (customs) as 
well as common ancestry, culture, history, and beliefs. The analysis of the ethnic dimension 
focuses on ‘ethnic’ causes, ‘ethnic’ narratives, and ‘ethnic’ violence. Here it is argued that the 
Ambon and Poso conflicts were no less ethnic than the Sambas conflict as they shared many 
of the same ethnic causes and, the ethnic narratives that were advanced, were similar. This 
article then looks at the conflict narratives, exploring why the religious narrative dominated 
in Ambon and Poso despite the involvement of different ethnic groups and why the ethnic 
narrative dominated in Sambas despite the involvement of different religions. It also reflects 
on why the ethnic conflict narrative was advanced mainly by non-Muslims, and whether the 
narrative framing had direct implications for the trajectory of the conflicts. Here two 
arguments are advanced: First, that the conflict narrative in Ambon and Poso was religious 
because it reflected the broader national religious tensions resulting from the resurgence of 
Islam in Indonesia since the 1990s while the ethnic narrative dominated in Sambas because it 
was the latest round of periodic anti-Madurese violence since the 1960s. The latter was 
‘defined’ as ‘ethnic’ at a time when Islam was in a weakened position in Indonesia with the 
defeat of the Darul Islam rebellions in 1962. Second, that the narratives were also framed and 
re-framed strategically, the latter accounting for the shift from an ethnic narrative to a 
religious one among Christians in Ambon and Poso. They thus influenced the trajectory of 
the conflict and were influenced by it.  
 
Ethnic causes 
When looking at the causes of the Ambon, Poso and Sambas conflicts it is impossible to 
overlook the changes in the ethnic composition of these three areas in the decades preceding 
the eruption of the violence. The in-migration of other ethnic groups changed the 
demographic balance leading to the marginalisation of the indigenous, resulted in the loss of 
ancestral land, and eroded local customary adat structures. All of these thus became ‘ethnic’ 
causes of conflict.  
 In-migration and the marginalisation of the indigenous 
Driven by the need to address overpopulation on Java, Bali and Lombok the central 
government pursued a transmigration policy to redistribute people from high population 
density areas to those with smaller populations (Hardjono 1977; Fasbender and Erbe 1990). 
The resettlement of transmigrants on the outer islands, however, was problematic as both the 
colonial and post-colonial government had fostered the sense that people of different regions 
were of different ethnicity. Indeed, ethnicity and locality overlapped to such an extent that 
they were assumed to be a single concept, what Tom Boellstorff refers to as ethnolocality 
(Boellstorff 2002, 25). Transmigrants were thus not seen by locals as fellow Indonesians but 
as ‘others’ and as their numbers grew, so did the competition and fears that locals were losing 
out.    
Between 1975 and 1990 Central Sulawesi saw the influx of 181,696 transmigrants, 
Maluku the influx of 139,465 transmigrants, and West Kalimantan the influx of 102,520 
transmigrants (Bertrand 2004, 93). This transmigration was perceived by locals as a 
fundamentally unequal process in which local land was appropriated by the state and given to 
migrants along with government assistance in the form of tools and seed. In Maluku, this 
resulted in the transmigrant farmers being seen as more competitive than locals who were not 
familiar with ‘modern’ agriculture.1 In West Kalimantan, it was believed to have led to the 
loss of land as well as jobs and when the local Dayak complained, they were ignored or 
simply labelled as ‘lazy’.2 
The transmigrants, who were mainly Javanese farmers, were followed by significant 
numbers of ‘spontaneous’ migrants of other ethnicities. The latter were not organised by the 
state but went on their own buoyed by the general pro-migration mood as well as the 
increased access to remote areas as new roads were constructed in accordance with the New 
Order’s developmentalist policies. The construction projects themselves attracted large 
numbers of spontaneous migrants who worked on the sites. The completed roads brought 
further migrants, small traders lured by the possibility of new markets.  
In Central Sulawesi the migrants flocked to the extractive industries such as ebony as 
well cash crops, soon dominating the clove, cacao, coffee and copra trade. They also owned 
the majority of small shops (HRW 2002, 6). Even the market in the Protestant highland 
stronghold of Tentena became dominated by Bugis, Gorontalo and Arab descent migrants 
with the effect that pork could no longer be purchased as the traders were Muslim (Damanik 
2003, 44). By the 1990s the key sectors of the economy were dominated by migrants because 
local Christians were more interested in civil service positions while the migrants were able 
to tap into existing ethnic trade networks. 
In West Kalimantan the spontaneous migrants were Bugis and Madurese. The latter 
became a particular thorn in the eyes of local Dayaks and Malays as they had followed 
Madurese transmigrants (DR, 29 March – 3 April 1999). This made them the largest migrant 
community. Moreover, according to locals, the Madurese, unlike the Bugis, did not integrate 
with society.
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 And in terms of employment they seemed to be everywhere. They worked as 
port labourers, on construction sites, on plantations, in coffee shops, and commerce. Their 
employment by logging companies and illegal loggers as well as construction companies that 
‘opened the jungle’ by building roads put them on a collision course with the rural Dayaks 
who sought to protect their resources. In the cities the Madurese were particularly numerous 
in the transport sector. In Pontianak they took over the becaks (pedicabs) from the Chinese
4
 
while in Sambas they pushed out the Malays. They also competed with Malay small traders 
and peddlers. 
  In Maluku the majority of spontaneous migrants were Bugis, Butonese and Makassar 
–  referred to as BBM. The BBM initially filled the emerging gaps in the economy as 
Ambonese Muslims climbed up the educational ladder.  Butonese migrants in the 1960s 
worked as labourers in the harbour.
5
 By the 1980s, they had also moved into fishing.
 
Bugis 
migrants worked as becak drivers and soon dominated local transport.  By 1996, locals found 
that they were losing in the competition with the outsiders and started blaming the migrants 
for problems ranging from the pollution of Ambon’s harbor,6 to rising Muslim Ambonese 
unemployment, and declining economic opportunities for Christian Ambonese (Bertrand 
2002, 73).  
 
The loss of ancestral lands  
In-migration also resulted in the loss of tanah adat (customary/ancestral lands) in West 
Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. The encroachment by the state on ancestral lands began 
with the Basic Agrarian Law 5/1960 which stated that customary land tenure only applied to 
the extent that it did not conflict with ‘national interests’ (ICG 2001, 15). Under Suharto 
further legislation was introduced with the specific purpose of appropriating the land for 
development. Basic Forestry Law 5/1967 claimed the country’s forests as state property. 
Basic Mining Law 11/1967 enabled the state to become the ultimate judge on land use.  And 
in 1973 presidential instruction number 2 designated 10 outer island provinces as new 
transmigration sites. For this, too, land was set aside. Thus the New Order systematically 
appropriated adat land.  
In Central Sulawesi it was primarily Pamona adat land that was used for 
transmigration sites while hundreds of hectares of Mori adat land were taken for palm oil 
plantations (Damanik 2003, 44). Government officials sold land and exploited the resources, 
including areas of hutan lindung (protected forest) resulting in repeated protests by the 
indigenous populations (Forum Cheq Recheq, n.d., 2). Not surprisingly, during the last 
decade of the New Order there were intermittent outbreaks of violence between the 
indigenous population and transmigrants which were put down by the military. 
From the 1990s onwards, spontaneous migrants also started to push into the interior of 
Poso district searching for land especially for cacao plantations (Damanik 2003, 44). This 
rose dramatically after the 1997 Asian financial crisis when cacao became the ‘“hot” export 
crop because it was pegged to the US dollar’ (Aragon 2001, 56). Some migrants did not even 
bother to purchase land but simply entered Pamona ancestral forests with chainsaws and cut 
down the trees to clear fields for cacao and other cash crops (HRW 2002, 6).  
In West Kalimantan it was Dayak adat land that was appropriated by Jakarta for 
transmigration, the logging industry, and plantations. Most Dayak land was communally 
owned but this was not recognised by the central government as ‘there are no formal land 
titles’.7 In many cases this meant the eviction and destruction of whole villages without 
compensation by the state (Dove 1997, 1). They were then relocated to new ‘modern’ villages 
with ‘modern’ houses, often forcibly by the army and police.8 It is estimated that as many as 
2.5 million Dayaks were displaced throughout Kalimantan.  
The land taken by the state was then given as concessions to logging and plantation 
companies. Between 1968 and 1973 timber production in West Kalimantan increased 25-fold 
from 127,894 to 3.3 million cubic meters (Davidson, n.d., 4). In the 1980s around 3 million 
hectares were given for large-scale, mainly palm oil plantations (Bappeda 1993, 11, table 
1.5). This land, too, was taken with little or no compensation or consultation.
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 The 
destruction of the forest by logging and plantation companies was further compounded by 
illegal logging, usually facilitated by corrupt local officials and protected by elements in the 
security forces.
 
 
Like the Pamona, Mori and Lore in Central Sulawesi, the Dayak protested their 
dispossession only to be accused of ‘obstructing national development’ (ICG 2001, 20) and to 
be labelled as ‘primitives’ (Djuweng 1997, 25-26). At the same time, whenever a Dayak 
felled a tree to meet household needs, he was treated like a criminal (The Jakarta Post, April 
20, 1999). Not surprisingly ‘the frustration of the Dayaks seeing the greedy exploitation of 
Kalimantan, the felling of trees and damage to the environment and all the wealth that was 
enjoyed in Jakarta’10 became one of the key reasons for the periodic Dayak violence.  
Conflict erupted with those migrants who were seen as collaborators in this process of 
dispossession: the Madurese. They were seen as being at ‘the forefront of the land grab’ from 
1967 onwards.
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 They were also working for the construction companies that were clearing 
the land and building roads into West Kalimantan’s interior. And when the logging 
companies arrived, it was the Madurese who cut down the trees the Dayaks saw as theirs. 
The loss of adat land had a traumatic impact on the indigenous communities in both 
Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan as land was intrinsically connected to the ancestral 
religions.  In these animistic belief systems soil, trees, plants, stones, and rivers were imbued 
with spirits living in harmony with man, constituting a ‘greater whole.’  Nature and resources 
were not economic assets and not subordinate to man but existed in harmony with him 
(Djuweng 1997, 12-14). This interconnectedness with the land had not changed when the 
Pamona, Lore, and Mori had become Protestants or when the Dayak had become Catholics. 
The land was still considered sacral. It was the ‘proof of the existence of their ancestors 
before them, a base on which to continue life at present, a future heirloom to be handed down 
to the next generation’ (Djuweng 1998, 6).  
 
Undermining and violating local adat 
While the loss of ancestral lands was central only to the growing ethnic tensions in West 
Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi, the ‘loss’ of adat or violation of adat played a key role in 
the eruption of violence in all three conflicts. During the New Order local adat was 
systematically undermined by the state’s nation-building efforts through centralisation, 
‘uniformisation’, and bringing all constituent elements of the Indonesian nation in line with 
the New Order’s national imaginary, which had a Javanese and ‘modern’ face. The policy 
which had the greatest impact on local adat was Law 5/1979 on Village Governance. Its 
purpose was to standardise village government across the archipelago as well as to replace 
‘outdated’ traditional village systems with a ‘modern’ one. This was detrimental for the vast 
majority of communities in Indonesia as this legislation was not ethnically neutral; it imposed 
the Javanese system, as the chosen model, on non-Javanese areas.  
 The Law on Village Governance removed power from customary leaders as well as 
customary councils of elders and placed it in the hands of the national civil service, 
increasing political control by outsiders and engineering new socio-political hierarchies.  In 
West Kalimantan the communally elected Dayak kepala adat (customary leader) was 
replaced by a politically elected kepala desa (village head). The requirement of a high school 
degree for candidates for village head, excluded most customary leaders from running (ICG 
2001, 18-19). However, it was not just village governance that was standardised but also 
village size. This led to the merger of distinct communities with ‘the component parts of the 
new villages … sometimes as much as eight or ten kilometres apart with the result that some 
villagers did not even know the village head’ (Ibid). 
 In Ambon, the impact of these administrative reforms was fourfold: First, the 
traditional raja negeri (village head) had to change his title to kepala desa, trading a title 
legitimated by adat for a purely administrative one. Second, under the new system, all adults 
living in a village had the same right to become kepala desa unlike the raja which had been 
an ‘ascribed status’ (Pariella 1996, 116). Third, the assault on adat weakened Ambon’s pela 
alliance system which tied together two or three different villages, irrespective of religion, 
into a brotherhood (Bartels 2010, 219). Pela relations created ‘cultural harmony’ which 
counter-balanced what one Ambonese referred to as ‘the silent religious conflict since the 
arrival of Christianity during the colonial era.’12 And fourth, the introduction of the elected 
kepala desa resulted in the loss of moral authority as most kepala desa were associated with 
the increasingly corrupt governing Golkar party. This, in turn, meant that when the conflict 
erupted in January 1999, local leaders had no capacity to calm the situation. 
The systematic erosion of local adat by the New Order regime was exacerbated by the 
in-migration into Ambon, Poso and West Kalimantan of other ethnic groups with their own, 
different customs. This caused tensions when local adat was disrespected. As Albert 
Tumimor, the grandson of the raja of Poso, recalled his grandfather saying: ‘I did not invite 
you [the migrants]. But if you want to stay here, respect our traditions.’ Tumimor then 
remarked that the migrants ‘did not behave like guests or what you would expect from 
newcomers. When they were here for a while and had become rich, they started to suppress 
the indigenous’.13 Many locals also felt that there was a tendency for migrants to feel more 
cultured than the locals and to behave arrogantly (Damanik 2003, 43).  
While disputes over land in the rural areas gave rise to ‘chronic’ conflict dynamics 
between locals and both transmigrants and spontaneous migrants, it was in the urban areas 
like Ambon city, Poso city and Sambas town where the incendiary mix of a high 
concentration of spontaneous migrants, high population density, high unemployment, and a 
high proportion of male youths created the ‘acute’ conflict that erupted in December 1998 
and January 1999. Here customs from the various migrant communities collided with local 
adat structures and the close proximity of indigenous and migrants combined with the 
political, economic and social competition heightened ethnic identity and ‘sharpened’ 
indigenous responses to transgressions of local adat by outsiders. At the same time traditional 
structures as a whole, both migrant and indigenous, were challenged by modernity and 
youthful rebellion which resulted in the disrespect of any adat or indeed authority.   
As can be seen from this discussion, the Ambon, Poso and Sambas conflicts clearly 
drew upon ‘ethnic’ grievances resulting from in-migration, the loss of ancestral land, and the 
erosion or violation of local adat in the years preceding the violence. The cumulative effect 
was a direct cultural or ‘ethnic’ threat which was a key cause of all three conflicts. 
 
Ethnic Violence 
To assess the extent to which the violence in Ambon, Poso, and Sambas was ‘ethnic’ it is 
useful to look at the targets, the motivation, and the modus operandi. In all three conflicts 
there was ethnic targeting. In the Ambon conflict this was most visible during the first few 
days when, in the context of the broader conflict in which violence was perpetrated against 
both Christians and Muslims, Christian Ambonese systematically attacked the BBM. On 19 
January 1999, they burnt the kiosks and then the becak owned by the Bugis and Butonese. On 
20 January, Ambonese Christians burnt the overwhelmingly Bugis owned stalls in Ambon 
city’s markets while taking care not to attack the shops of the Chinese (Rahawarin 2000, 3-4).  
They also burned a Butonese settlement and stopped public busses and becak as symbols of 
the BBM. There were calls for the BBM to leave Maluku
14
 as well as anti-BBM banners and 
slogans (Ummat, February 15, 1999). Former Ambon mayor Dicky Wattimena, who was 
known for his anti-BBM politics,
 
was seen giving orders during the violence and telling the 
BBM to go home (Ibid). By the end of the first phase of the conflict in May 1999, the 
overwhelming majority of BBM had fled to Sulawesi.   
The BBM were targeted because they had demographically increased the Muslim 
share of the population in a precariously balanced Muslim-Christian society. They were 
blamed for the consequent decrease in the Christian share of the local resources in the decade 
preceding the conflict and, with the impending June 1999 elections, it was feared that the 
BBM would increase the vote for the Muslim parties (Van Klinken 2001, 22).  They were 
also seen as a cultural threat,
15
 diluting and undermining Ambonese adat. Ambonese 
Christians further believed that Ambon’s Muslims would like to see them leave to reduce the 
economic competition, but were too polite to say so.  
Ethnic targeting also occurred in the Poso conflict, in this case by both indigenous and 
migrants. In the first two phases – 24-29 December 1998 and 15-20 April 2000 - street battles 
were fought between the migrant Bugis residents of Kayamanya and the Pamona and Mori 
residents of the Sayo and Lombogia neighbourhoods of Poso city (Aragon 2001, 60). In both 
phases most of those injured, most of the houses destroyed, and most of the displaced were 
Pamona and Mori. The third phase in May-June 2000, was an organised and planned attack 
by the Pamona. One of the areas targeted was the village of Sintuwulemba where prospering 
migrant cacao farmers were ‘the focus of jealousy’ by their indigenous Pamona neighbours 
‘who had watched their ancestral holdings shrink as the migrants continued to purchase more 
land’ (Aragon 2001, 68). On 28 May, Sintuwulemba was attacked, 200 houses burnt down, 
and those migrants who did not manage to flee were hacked to death.
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 Over the next couple 
of days the Pamona fighters proceeded to round up those who had fled into the nearby forest. 
One Pamona youth, who had participated in the attack ‘returned to Tentena with 50 identity 
cards which he had taken off the people he had killed’17 – they were all migrants.  
The motivations for targeting the migrants in the Poso conflict were similar to those in 
the Ambon conflict. ‘They targeted the Bugis, Gorontalo and Javanese because they were an 
economic threat … and because they were aggressive.’18 The Pamona retribution in the third 
phase of the conflict, moreover, was explained as a response to the fact that virtually all of 
the destruction in the first and second phases was of Pamona property. It was also a response 
to the role played by the migrants in that violence, the cultural marginalisation and 
dislocation of locals (Aditjondro 2004). 
The Sambas conflict, too, saw ethnic targeting. The conflict erupted when some 200 
Madurese attacked the Malay village of Paretsetia over the detention of a Madurese who had 
been caught burgling a house the previous day. The lack of capacity of the police to deal with 
the Madurese attackers (Kompas, January 22, 1999) gave rise to the mobilisation of Malays 
throughout Sambas district. On 21 February 1999, armed with traditional weapons such as 
spears and swords they went in search of Madurese. They burnt down 20 houses in the 
villages of Sebangkau Semparuk and Tebas Sungai (Suara Karya, February 24, 1999). Later 
they killed two Madurese in Sungai Kelambu. On the night of 23 February, a crowd of 
Malays attacked the local police station (Merdeka, February 25, 1999) where Madurese had 
taken shelter. When this round of violence subsided 16 people had been killed and 81 houses 
and two trucks burnt (Kompas, February 23, 1999). It had also triggered a Madurese exodus 
from Sambas district.  
The second phase of the Sambas conflict started on 15 March and the Malays were 
now joined by the Dayaks in targeting the Madurese. The Dayaks attacked the Madurese who 
lived in the villages of Pantai, Semparuk, Harapan, Lonam, and Serapan. They then joined 
the Malays and headed for Madurese settlements with jerry cans filled with petrol (GAMMA, 
March 28, 1999). Throughout Sambas roadblocks were set up and every car was stopped and 
searched for Madurese (Tempo, March 28, 1999), who were then beheaded. Open trucks 
carried triumphant men holding up heads as crowds cheered and shouted ‘Long live the 
Malays’ while brandishing spears and long knives (The Sunday Times, March 21, 1999). By 
early May, with the Madurese expelled from Sambas district, Dayak and Malay combatants 
ran out of targets and the mobilisations ceased (Davidson 2008, 134). According to official 
statistics at the end of the conflict 35,000 Madurese had been displaced and more than 2,500 
houses burnt (The Jakarta Post, July 20, 1999). 
The reasons for targeting the Madurese in Sambas shared many similarities with 
reasons for targeting migrants in Poso and Ambon: economic competition, disrespect of local 
adat, usurpation of indigenous land. The modus operandi of Malays and Dayaks, however, 
appeared to be more distinctly ethnic, and, interestingly, tied only to Dayak customs. Indeed 
Dayaks held adat-based war ceremonies before they attacked. They also explained the 
beheadings and triumphant display of heads by pointing to their ‘headhunting’ heritage. This 
was echoed by much of the contemporaneous media. Academic analyses in comparison see 
the Dayak violence as drawing upon a ‘reimagined’ headhunting past. 
The divergence between the participant narratives and observer narratives on the 
Malays is even greater. Malay explanations for adopting ‘headhunting’ practices revolved 
around the Madurese being aggressive, rude, dishonest, hot tempered, individualistic, and 
lacking respect for other people’s traditions and property.19 The ‘brutality’ of the violence 
was thus the result of extreme anger. Dayaks explained the Malay behaviour as the result of 
Dayak traditions having been introduced into the Malay community by the ‘large number of 
Dayaks who converted to Islam and thus became Malay’.20 These Malays were of Dayak 
origin, shared the Dayak ancestors and were tied to Dayak adat which ‘explains why the 
Malay-Madurese conflict followed a similar pattern including the eating of human flesh and 
the drinking of blood.’21 Scholars such as Davidson and Van Klinken argue that the 
appropriation of Dayak war practices was a reaction to earlier Dayak ethnic mobilization in 
1997, with the aim of asserting equality in indigeneity (Davidson 2008) and reclaiming lost 
positions in local government (Van Klinken 2008, 1). What ties participant and observer 
narratives together is indeed indigeneity. This is conferred either through genealogy or 
through emulation and, arguably, the Dayak narrative portraying the Malays as being of 
Dayak origin is recognition of the indigenous status of the Malays.  
 
Conflict narratives: ethnic vs religious 
The violence which erupted in Poso, Ambon and Sambas in 1998/1999 clearly had an ethnic 
dimension as the above discussion demonstrates. It also, however, had a religious dimension 
which was not about religion per se but about what Lorraine Aragon in her analysis of the 
Poso conflict termed ‘the political economy of being Protestant or Muslim’ (Aragon 2001, 
47). The in-migration into all three areas was overwhelmingly Muslim which changed the 
local religious balance and led non-Muslims in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and West 
Kalimantan to speculate about the ‘real’ agenda of Jakarta. Many Dayaks believed that the 
government wanted ‘to reduce the indigenous people’22  and to keep ‘the Christian population 
small.’23 The belief that transmigration aimed at the Islamisation of areas with historically 
large Christian populations was also wide-spread.
24
 This speculation was grounded in the 
changes in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s which saw a resurgence of Islam at a popular 
level followed by a shift in attitude of the central government which led to the establishment 
of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association or Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia 
(ICMI) headed by Vice President BJ Habibie. ICMI actively sought to increase the number of 
Muslims in leading positions in government and society in the eastern provinces.  
Against these developments at national level the increasing number of Muslim 
migrants placed considerable strain on the informal Christian-Muslim power-sharing 
arrangements in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. Poso district saw a shift from a fairly evenly 
balanced population
25
 to a 57.2 percent Muslim majority by the end of the New Order. 
Moreover, between 1989 and 1999 the top fifty positions in the office of the bupati (regent), 
the heads of offices, agencies, divisions, and sub-districts saw the percentage of Christian 
office holders drop from 54 per cent to 39 per cent (Mappangara 2001, appendix 2). Dating 
from the appointment of Arief Patanga as bupati, it was not only the number of Muslim 
bureaucrats which increased but practically all leaders of the executive and legislative were 
members of ICMI (Damanik 2003, xxxvii), including many migrants.
  
Similarly, between 1971 and 1990 the percentage of Muslims in Maluku province 
grew from 49.9 to 56.8 (Van Klinken 2001, 12). By 1997, it had reached 59.02 percent (ICG 
2002, 1).  While at provincial level the balance shifted from 50/50 to 40/60 in favour of the 
Muslims, in Ambon city the religious balance shifted from a Christian majority of 57.5 
percent to just under 50 percent which included at least 50,000 Muslim migrants from South 
Sulawesi (Jubilee Campaign UK 1999, 4). These changes dated back to the first Muslim 
governor Akip Latuconsina in 1992 who was also the provincial head of ICMI. His 
appointment was seen as the start of the political marginalization of Ambon’s Christians as 
Latuconsina ‘reformed’ Maluku’s civil service by removing ‘top bureaucrats with Christian 
names’, replacing them with Muslims (Van Klinken 2001, 19).26 By 1996, all the bupatis in 
Maluku province were Muslim (Bertrand 2004, 118). Most new teachers hired by the 
government were Muslims. Moreover many originated from outside Maluku.
 
In light of this religious dimension, the question arises why non-Muslims in Ambon 
and Poso advanced an ethnic narrative when the conflicts erupted as exemplified by 
Ambonese Christian ‘commander’ Emang Nikijuluw’s explanation that the Ambon conflict 
‘was not a clash between Ambonese Muslims and Christians but between Ambonese 
Christians and the BBM.’ 27 
The ethnic narrative appealed for three key reasons: First, it more accurately reflected 
the multiple grievances and complex causes of the conflicts rather than reducing them to 
religion as the sole factor. Second, it allowed the Christians to frame their fears with respect 
to the Islamic resurgence in a way they believed would not upset indigenous Muslims with 
whom relations were largely harmonious, aided by the fact that they had a shared local 
history, culture, and even ancestors. Third, it allowed them to put forward their grievances in 
a ‘neutral’ way in country in which the Islamisation had considerably narrowed the space for 
Christians to advance a ‘religious narrative’ as many Muslims associated Christians not just 
with colonial history but the more recent appearance of aggressive evangelical missionaries 
and the policies of ‘western imperialists’. 
Muslims in Ambon and Poso from the beginning of the two conflicts advanced a 
religious narrative. This narrative in Ambon emphasised that the attack against Muslims, who 
were celebrating Idul Fitri, had been planned by Christians in the Protestant Maranatha 
church.
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  The violence was referred to as ‘Idul Fitri berdarah’ (bloody Idul Fitri). In Poso 
Muslims emphasised that a Muslim youth had been stabbed in a mosque by a Christian on 
Christmas Eve.
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Why did Muslims in Ambon and Poso advance a religious narrative? First, for most 
local Muslims this was simply a reflection of reality as they saw it, evidenced by the violence 
erupting on religious holidays and the targeting of religious buildings. Second, the shift away 
from distinctly local Muslim practices towards a more universal Islam over the previous two 
decades, had created a religious solidarity between local Muslims and Muslim migrants, 
although their relationship remained complicated on an ethnic, social, economic and political 
level. Third, the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia in the years immediately preceding the 
conflict had strengthened Muslim identity to such an extent that it had become the core 
identity for many Muslims in Ambon and Poso. And fourth, the religious narrative provided 
local Muslims with a vehicle for appealing to Muslims in other parts of Indonesia for 
humanitarian assistance after the conflict erupted. For Ambonese Muslims there was an 
additional, fifth, reason: they were not convinced that the BBM were targeted for ethnic 
reasons and feared that they would be next.
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In 1999 the first volunteers from Jemaah Islamiyya (JI) and Kompak arrived in 
Ambon followed by Laskar Jihad in 2000; JI and Kompak arrived in Poso in 2000 and Laskar 
Jihad in 2001. They came to provide humanitarian aid, to defend their fellow Muslims and 
for dakwa (proselytization).  The arrival of these mujahedin reinforced the religious narrative 
by recasting the conflict as a jihad. Their participant narrative diverged somewhat from that 
of most local Muslims in that it added salafi notions of puritanism as well as international 
jihadi notions of conflict between Islam and the Zionist-Crusader alliance. Laskar Jihad’s 
extreme anti-Christian rhetoric, moreover, played a key role in shifting the narrative 
advanced by Christians in Ambon and Poso from an ethnic one to a religious one. It also 
resulted in a  shift from trying to appeal to the Indonesian government for help to appealing 
to the Christian World as well as the United Nations (Damanik 2003, 78).  Here the key role 
was played by the churches (Hehanussa 2013, 226), further reinforcing the reframing of the 
narrative along religious lines.  
 
This shift is interesting as it shows that narratives can influence the trajectory of the 
conflict - as the arrival of the mujahedin proves - and that changes in the trajectory of the 
conflict can, conversely, reframe existing narratives. It also reveals that narratives can be a 
strategic choice. The shift in the Christian narrative was not just a response to the attacks on 
their religion but it was also a strategic reframing of the narrative signalling ‘giving up’ on 
waiting for help from the Indonesian government in favour of trying to get help from the 
international community. It reflected the recognition that while Christians had little to gain 
from a religious (Christian) narrative in an Indonesian national context, a religious narrative 
served them better than an ethnic one in an international context as it tapped into increasing, 
mainly western, concerns about militant Islam and the persecution of Christian minorities.    
This leaves the participant narratives in the Sambas conflict which were and remained 
ethnic, partially because this was a much shorter conflict with fewer opportunities for a 
narrative shift but also because there was a clear victor from the outset. The Dayak narrative 
emphasised the Madurese violation of adat, their cultural incompatibility, and their lack of 
indigeneity. The Malay narrative similarly pointed to the ‘Madurese character’ as aggressive 
and disrespectful, stereotyping them as thieves, and stressing their migrant origins. The 
Madurese narrative portrayed the Madurese as helpless victims of ‘primitive barbarity’ who 
had been forsaken by the Indonesian government and security forces.  
Why was the Sambas conflict seen as ethnic despite the fact that the actors were 
Catholic and animist Dayaks, Muslim Malays, and Muslim Madurese? Moreover, why did 
the Malays as Muslims fight alongside the non-Muslim Dayaks against their fellow Muslim 
Madurese?  
There are five interconnected explanations:  First, the Sambas conflict must be viewed 
not as a stand-alone conflict but as an episode of the broader anti-Madurese violence in West 
Kalimantan since the beginning of the New Order. This conflict had started as one over land 
and land was at the heart of at least 11 outbreaks of anti-Madurese violence between 1967 
and 1997 (DR, 29 March – 3 April 1999). However, it was also seen as a Madurese assault on 
the rural Dayak way of life and everything that defined ‘being Dayak’. It thus was cast not 
simply as an indigenous-migrant or a land conflict but as an ethnic struggle. Second, the 
broader Madurese-Dayak conflict erupted at a time when the Indonesian national mood had 
swung against Islamism. The defeat of the Darul Islam (DI) rebellions, which had challenged 
the Indonesian state from 1948 to 1962, as well as the relegation to the political periphery of 
Muslim groups involved in the violence of 1965-66, effectively closed the door to a narrative 
of ‘religious violence’. Religion, in general, and Islam, in particular, were portrayed as a 
force in retreat by Jakarta while ‘secular’ nationalism and developmentalism were hailed. 
This made it ‘un-strategic’ for the Madurese to cast the conflict in Muslim-Christian terms 
and allowed the Dayak to shape the conflict narrative as an ethnic one. Third, moving on 
specifically to Sambas, the initial violence was between two Muslim groups. Constructing a 
narrative around ‘Idul Fitri berdarah’ was thus difficult despite the fact that the violence, like 
that in Ambon, erupted on Idul Fitri. What set the Malays and Madurese apart was ethnicity 
as well as the latter’s clear status as migrants – not religion. Fourth, the Malays felt closer to 
the Dayak than the Madurese as they had a shared, albeit separate, history in West 
Kalimantan but also cultural and family links through Dayak conversions to Islam and inter-
marriage. And finally, fifth, Muslim Malays sided with non-Muslim Dayaks against Muslim 
Madurese because they not only felt economically threatened in the cities with the Madurese 
moving into urban areas in large numbers, but they also wanted to strengthen their position in 
local politics vis-à-vis the Dayaks and the only way to do this was through asserting 
indigeneity as Davidson has argued (Davidson 2008). That then explains the ‘Dayak-like’ 
headhunting and the thoroughly un-Islamic drinking of blood and consumption of human 
flesh despite the admonishment by the ulama.
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Conclusion 
The Ambon, Poso and Sambas conflicts erupted during Indonesia’s transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy. They were linked to the struggle for political power and 
control over resources in the context of decentralisation. All three conflicts shared similar 
causes resulting from the in-migration of other ethnic groups and the disrespect of local adat 
by migrants coupled with social, economic, and political competition between locals and 
migrants. In all three cases violence by indigenous actors specifically targeted migrants in 
order to defend their local resources, particularly land, from encroachment by migrants and 
the Indonesian state. Thus, there is little to suggest that the Sambas conflict was somehow 
inherently more ethnic than the other two. Indeed, the ethnic narratives advanced by the non-
Muslims in all three conflicts were broadly similar in their emphasis on the indigenous 
experience of physical, social, cultural, and political displacement by migrants from other 
ethnic backgrounds. Yet, participant and observer narratives on the Ambon and Poso 
conflicts were largely framed in religious terms while those on the Sambas conflict cast the 
violence as ethnic.  
It has been argued here that at a broader level, the religious narrative dominated in the 
Ambon and Poso conflicts because it reflected the religious tensions nationally resulting from 
the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia since the 1990s while the ethnic narrative dominated in 
the Sambas conflict because there was an extant historical narrative, which was ethnic as it 
predated this resurgence.  
The ethnic narrative was retained in Sambas because the first phase of the violence 
pitted Muslims of different ethnicity against each other which precluded a religious narrative. 
The entry of the non-Muslim Dayaks into the conflict in the second phase did not result in a 
narrative shift because the political, economic and social interests of the Malays lay in 
emphasizing shared indigeneity with the Dayaks rather than shared religion with the 
Madurese. Moreover, the fact that the conflict overall was quite brief, when compared with 
the Ambon and Poso conflicts, limited the scope for an ‘evolving’ narrative. And finally, the 
episodic nature of the broader anti-Madurese violence in West Kalimantan not only 
reinforced the existing narrative but self-validated it. 
In comparison, the Ambon and Poso conflicts were of recent nature, following several 
decades of peaceful co-existence between local Christians and Muslims. They erupted at a 
time of Islamic resurgence leading local Muslims to almost automatically adopt a religious 
narrative as it reflected their core identity at the time and resonated with broader Muslim 
grievances resulting from the first two decades of the New Order. Local Christians advanced 
an ethnic or mixed narrative which then shifted to a religious narrative as the conflicts 
progressed over years. This shift reflected a change in the conflict trajectory with the arrival 
of the mujahedin and particularly the arrival of Laskar Jihad, which resulted in the Christians 
seeing themselves as victims of religious aggression but also in a strategic reframing of the 
narrative in order to appeal to the international community. 
More generally, the comparison of these three conflicts has shown the impact and 
importance of national and even global dynamics on the shaping of local conflict narratives 
as well as why some narratives have historical durability. It has also illustrated that 
narratives, particularly in protracted, on-going conflicts, are often reframed to reflect 
developments on the ground or strategic needs, resulting in the emergence of a particular 
narrative even when a different one was equally valid.  And finally, it has been demonstrated 
that the competing interests of the actors result in a contest of narrative framing. It is this area 
which has considerable scope for further research by delving more deeply into the question of 
which actors get to frame or reframe the narrative, which ones are excluded from the process, 
and why.  
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